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almost all of which had been rapidly gaining strength since the turn of the century.? Indeed, the auspicious developments within the political environment during the decade before Curti remarks: "Even the more cautious and realistic believed that the dawn of peace could not be far off, if it was not already at hand."5 A natural question, at this point, is why Ginn set up still another peace organization when apparently the peace movement needed his money rather than another institution to jostle against the many already in existence. Two motives persuaded him to act. First of all, he felt that the particular area in which the Foundation was to operate, that of education, was being neglected. Too much of the peace work was devoted to abstract and technical problems, while the conversion of the masses, particularly young people, was being ignored.6 Integrally related to this motive was his preoccupation with the need for business-like efficiency in the peace campaign. As a friend once remarked to him, he dealt with the promotion of peace in the same way that he dealt with promotion of textbooks.' This attitude colored and eventually dominated Ginn's policies as president of the Foundation. Thus, when comparing the total of more than a billion dollars spent annually by nations for armaments to the mere hundred thousand spent on peace, he invariably concluded: "Does not this indicate strongly the trend of public sentiment upon this question?"'8 His inference reveals the extent to which he was an accountant of emotional commitment.
Ginn's donation to the peace movement in 191o was not simply a sudden inspiration. As far back as 9go01 he was asking: "We spend hundreds of millions a year for war; can we afford to spend one million for peace?"9 And in the same year his creation of the International Library provided organized expression for both his ideas and his wealth. By means of this 5 Peace or War ... ,p. 196. institution he hoped to sell peace literature at a price low enough for the general public to afford. By 1gog he felt that a larger scope of activity was feasible and, in a letter to the Nation, he appealed for other rich men to join him in the formation of a peace organization, the outline of which he sketched at length.10 The premise underlying his appeal, one which he never abandoned, was that the peace campaign would succeed only with contributions by other men of their effort and especially their money. It was for this reason that he withheld his gift of. one million dollars until after his death, for he believed that too large an initial sum would encourage others to feel that their money was not needed."1 Because of the lack of response to his letter, however, he had to act autonomously and hope that others would participate in the Foundation once it was active.
At the first annual meeting of July 12, 1910, the Foundation was incorporated with the intention, as stated in the by-laws, to educate the people about the evil and wastefulness of war, to encourage international justice "and generally by every practical means to promote peace and good-will among all mankind."' The actual structure was more precise than these heady abstractions. The model was that of a college: the trustees to serve without salary for seven years and to be responsible for general policy, for the supervision of funds and for the election of officers, while the directors ("faculty") were to be salaried and to conduct the daily activity of the corporation.
Although the nine men present elected themselves as the first board of trustees, a second board, organized at the second meeting in December and including five of the first board, is of more direct interest here because it held office throughout most of the period until 1917 Before considering in detail the activities of the Foundation, it is important to locate its personnel in a context. Clearly this group was dominated by educators, but there was also evident a strong business element exemplified in Ginn, Plimpton, and Samuel Capen, the latter being a rug manufacturer as well as a reformer who was made a trustee in 1911. The element of religion was strong, not only in the persons of Reverend Messrs. Cummings, Mott, and Brown, but also as represented by Capen, who was president of the American Board of Commissions for Foreign Missions, by Faunce, who had been a Baptist clergyman, by Dutton, whose father had been a Congregational deacon and who once had considered the ministry as a career, and by Ginn himself, who also had considered the ministry temporarily.14 These three types of interests account Two other factors were strong enough to be noted. In the first place, almost all of these men came from poor or modest backgrounds and many were very self-conscious of their ascent from poverty to success by hard, individual effort. Ginn typified this feeling when he wrote that, as a child, he had been "blessed with poverty. You may think that sounds strange; but where poverty harms one child, wealth ruins a thousand."'5
Secondly, a striking number of these men belonged to families whose ancestors had landed in America before the middle of the seventeenth century.16 This fact has a significance to be discussed later.
Although the members of the Foundation shared many personal traits, even more obviously they were united by the complex network of reform activities which characterized the Progressive age. That is to say, most of these men had been involved in reform long before the creation of the Foundation, and now brought a common experience and set of premises to their work in this new organization. Clearly there was an impressive overlap of personnel, a fact which indicates, perhaps, the relatively small number of individuals exerting themselves for the cause of peace, but which also indicates that the peace movement, although fragmented into organizations which too often duplicated one another's work, operated from a unanimity on principles. These men were in full agreement on the ideals toward which they were laboring-disarmament, the substitution of rational for armed settlement of international conflicts and, most intangible of all, international amity and cooperation.
Although united in respect to ideals, the peace movement was much less in concurrence about the best techniques by which to realize these ends. The situation within the Foundation most clearly manifests the nature of this dispute. As mentioned above, Ginn was primarily motivated by a concern for efficiency in the peace effort. On this important point he differed from many of his colleagues, particularly Mead who was the Foundation's central figure in terms of energy, experience, and prestige. If Ginn was the businessman of the peace movement, Mead was its prophet, exerting himself to incredible lengths in order to make his ideas known. Mead was well known as a reformer, especially in Boston, because of his concern for urban problems, his participation in the AntiImperialist League and the Twentieth Century Club and, finally, because of his editorship of the New England Magazine. After the turn of the century he devoted most of his energy specifically to the peace movement. It was he whom Ginn had chosen as editor of the International Library and now placed on the Foundation's board of directors, from 1912 to 1915 as its chief. Mead's whole life was dedicated to reform and his world was defined in those terms. 20 It is apparent that he and Ginn complemented each other with coinciding approaches of idealism and efficiency, but it also was natural that the juxtaposition of their temperaments would tend to be abrasive. When Ginn suggested in 1911, for example, that the Foundation needed a business manager, Mead replied with an undertone of arrogance: "It is perfectly evident to me, as it has been from the beginning, and as I expect is now evident to you also, that, whatever titles have been carelessly distributed, the real responsibility for the administration of the Foundation must rest with me, just as the preliminary work of these years for bringing the Foundation to its present position has been mine." 21 Ginn never overcame this temperamental and ideological separation from Mead, the Foundation's vital center. This isolation increased because the other major individual in the Foundation, David Starr Jordan, fully shared Mead's views. Jordan's background as a biologist was very different from Mead's, but his ascent from poverty to success and his strenuously moral advocacy of reform coincided with the traits of his colleague. Both men believed that the greatest success in educating the masses would result from the inspiration of a few agitators, a few prophets.22 As for Ginn's insistence that the peace movement would succeed only if the general public gave its money along with its attention, Jordan argued that it was 486 THE NEW ENGLAND QUARTERLY certainly more probable that fifty men would each give $1000 than that fifty thousand men would each give one dollar. 23 This lack of cohesion between idealism and tactics within the Foundation was characteristic of the whole American peace movement. In fact, the disjunction of means and ends, of accomplishments and intentions, which was to confront Progressives because of American participation in the war, already can be seen in this division among pacifists.
It is within the framework of this dual leadership by Ginn on the one hand, and Mead and Jordan on the other, and against the general background of reform by them and their associates, that one should view the Foundation's activities during the prewar years. Its guiding purpose was to obtain the cooperation of the crucial organs of publicity in the countrythe schools, press, pulpits, and business organizations-for the dissemination of its principles. Certain definite methods were used and therefore its activities are most easily described in terms of categories rather than chronology. Primary, particularly since Ginn himself was a publisher, was the distribution of peace literature. Pamphlets, being more appealing and less expensive than books, were the usual format, and in its first year the Foundation circulated 300,000 copies of several tracts written either by the members themselves or by historic proponents of peace such as Immanuel Kant.24 Another mode of publicity was excerpts or precis of articles and speeches which Mead compiled for distribution to newspapers. As he explained to Ginn, "One can often bring down game with three hundred words, where three thousand would not pierce the skin."25 Finally, many of the Foundation members wrote under their own auspices, Jordan and Mead being especially prolific.
Although the written word was important, the spoken word was felt to be ultimately more effective, so the Foundation its constitution so that its board of directors would include a representative from each of six major peace organizations, among which was the World Peace Foundation.30 An event which gained more public interest than either of these, however, was Andrew Carnegie's announcement, in December of 19lo, that he was creating the ten million dollar Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Ginn's contribution to peace no longer was unique; in fact, within less than a decade it had been overshadowed tenfold.
Yet the Foundation welcomed the immense prestige and financial vigor which Carnegie injected into the movement, and Ginn was hopeful that other rich men were at last following his example. There could be no rivalry because Carnegie's organization was concerned with a very different sphere, that of research into the causes of war and the ways to remove them. In fact, immediately after Carnegie's announcement of his grant, Ginn began to consider ways in which some of this money could be channeled into the Foundation for its work.31 He was entranced by the vision of financial and administrative efficiency which would result from an alliance of the two corporations.
Unfortunately, when he proposed to Carnegie that they cooperate to secure $25,000,000 for the peace movement, $500,000 of which the Foundation could use "very effectively,"
Carnegie was distinctly cool to the idea, It is evident that Ginn's premises about human psychology and business practices were becoming more intractable than ever. As he transferred to his. peace work the laissez-faire principles which had been successfully enacted in his own career, he increased his isolation within the Foundation and lost all sympathy with its policies. His axiom that "people are interested [only] in that in which they have an investment" led him to condemn the lectures of his colleagues as touching merely "the very outsides" of the problem of educating the people. A passive audience which is not asked to contribute effort and money, he said, will not be converted, will only be entertained.3" In fact, he carried this reasoning to the point of raising the prices of the peace books, contrary to the policy of the International Library a decade before.36 Finally, he urged the Foundation to begin the creation of "hundreds of thousands of centers of activity" all over the world, from which was to emanate a network of codrdinated propaganda obtaining the public's active support, financial and intellectual. By the time that he had come to these attitudes in 1912 he no longer attended the Mohonk Conferences, the scene of his own conversion to the cause of peace, because he felt that they produced more rhetoric than activity. 37 Ginn was never successful in converting his colleagues to 33 It is fair to say that Ginn's obsession with self-help and a balanced budget was exaggerated beyond validity. Nevertheless, it gave needed balance to the ineffectuality of the majority of pacifists who were so concerned with their ideology that they overlooked the awkwardness of the machinery by which they publicized that ideology. The successes of arbitration treaties, battleship reductions and the like only inflated their confidence. Ginn and others of his opinion were a disregarded minority.
The death of the Foundation's creator and president saddened its members but hardly disturbed their activities. Six months later a death with much more serious consequences for the peace movement occurred at Sarajevo. The first World War had begun with shocking suddenness. The event was a tremendous blow to the hopes and plans of the pacifists who had anticipated the eradication of war and now were drastically contradicted. At the annual meeting of the board of trustees in November, 1914 an appropriate point, then, to turn to a discussion of the ideology with which the Foundation and the whole American peace movement were operating before the war explosively gave birth to a new era.
II
The most illuminating method of presenting the philosophy of the peace workers is to begin with their explanation of the causes of war, for it was on the basis of this analysis that they devised their proposed solutions. From among the possible stimuli to armed conflict they isolated armaments as the primary factor.41 Yet this reasoning, alluring because of its simplicity, obscured a crucial ambiguity, for there is a vast difference between arms as a cause of war and arms as a condition of war. If the pacifists meant the second, they were merely stating the trivial circularity that a war cannot be fought without weapons. If they meant the first, they were ignoring the r61le of political and economic motives which undoubtedly play a part in the outbreak of all wars. The more perceptive peace workers recognized and avoided this logical dead end.
Realizing that the weapons were murderous only when used and that war really was the consequence of their use rather than of their existence, these advocates of peace ascribed both the existence and the use to a minority of the world's population, the minority which profited from the production of war materials. In this way they absolved the public from any responsibility for international violence, shifting the blame to an evil few. Jordan expressed this point blatantly when he said: "The defence our nations need is not protection from each other, but rather defence from the money-lender and from the armament syndicate."42 Thus, the "merchants of death" argument, so popular in the postwar period, was also a major tenet in the pacifists' thesis before the first World War. Again and again, militarism was described as the "enslavement of the people."48 Yet this type of argument became particularly persuasive, in the opinion of its proponents, only when allied with the expos6 of another malevolent aspect of armaments, their cost. The enslavement by weapons was not even so appalling as the enslavement by taxes and debt. The usual technique of the peace propagandists was to calculate the huge national expenditures on arms and then, in an appeal to the common sense of the audience or readers, to sketch the innumerable constructive ways in which this money could be spent for the good, rather than the death, of the people. Reasoning from pre-Keynsian economic theory, they believed it was an obvious fact that "the greater the sea power, the weaker the nation which buys it on borrowed money.""44 By thus drawing a tacit analogy between the individual and the nation--a favorite method of the pacifists-they devised a kind of logic which, it was hoped, would be compelling to the average man.
In the field of economics the peace movement wielded a more sophisticated type of argument taken directly from Norman Angell's The Great Illusion. The author's main line of reasoning was that the international character of commerce and credit invalidated the possibility that war could be successfully waged for profits. An aggressive nation would discover either that everything would be the same after the war, everyone buying and selling and profiting regardless of the altered frontiers and therefore without any economic gains by the "victorious" nation, or that the conquered territory would be devastated, in which case it was a liability to the "victors." The inescapable inference, then, was that war had become an anachronism in the modern world bound by an interdependent economy.45 with the exceptions of Ginn, Plimpton and a few others. Although these men tended to be on the chronological fringes of the Progressive generation, which Hofstadter describes as reaching the age of thirty around 189o, this fact becomes trivial when added to the above evidence and to the incessant reform activities in which most of them were engaged.
Far more convincing than a sociological parallel is an ideological one. Both movements possessed a secular faith that men are rational creatures who, when educated, can be relied upon to act morally, whether in their personal lives or in their r6les as citizens. On such premises, the pacifists confidently argued that wars are the consequence of misguided thinking, of ignorance rather than malice. Similarly, it was this trust in human rationality which impelled the World Peace Foundation to concentrate on education. At the core of these ideas was a great and urgent belief in democracy. The Progressivist solutions of initiative, referendum and recall, for example, were derived from the same kind of reasoning which Mead used in advocating an international court. When nations have to explain the facts of an international dispute before a public tribunal, he declared, when they have to justify their actions, "the end of war will be in sight; for no man living can remember a war whose inauguration would have been able to abide the world's critcial discussion."47 The vital optimism of these views is best defined as humanistic. Both movements took for granted the inevitable progress of mankind, progress which they described as often in material as in moral terms, but very rarely in religious ones. Thus, although many members of the Foundation were directly or indirectly concerned with religion, they did not describe the immorality of war as an infraction of God's will; rather, the sin was the infraction of human potentiality, of civilization itself. Reverend Edward Cummings furnished a succinct example of this theme in a sermon at the Boston South Congre- 
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THE NEW ENGLAND QUARTERLY gational Church in 1909. "Peace," he announced, "is the thing most needed to guarantee prosperity. International justice and a properly organized family of nations is the next great step in social and political evolution. It also represents the best aspirations of morality and religion."48 The belated addition of "morality and religion" dramatically illustrates the priority which prosperity and justice had among the justifications of peace. They were equally high among the Progressivist priorities.
The confident trust in progress as a natural force operating within society was intimately allied with a belief in laissez faire. Both of these movements were confident that general prosperity and peace would result most directly and effectively from the unrestrained economic activity of individuals who would see their own, and therefore everyone's, best interests. Yet the two reform groups recognized that this ideal did not at all correspond to the reality of an American economy clogged by monopoly and of a world caught in an accelerating arms race. To explain this deviation they blamed certain segments of the population who had acquired power by unjust means and now were using it for rapacious profit. Both used a muckraking approach to expose such malevolent practices, whether by captains of industry or the arms syndicate, with the intention of directing public outrage and restraint upon these groups. The reformers' ultimate goal was not a welfare state but a return to genuine expression of individuality. Jordan's remark that "unwise charity is responsible for half the pauperism of the world" is typical of the thinking of his colleagues and of most Progressives.49 Another peace worker expressed the real emphasis of these reformers when he declared: "Once remove the forces which now stunt body, mind and soul, and in a single generation a new breed of men will be produced .. From these several philosophical tenets the two reform groups devised methods by which to ensure the fulfillment of their ideals and which, not surprisingly, followed almost identical lines. Rule by law rather than men was the crucial formula for a system of rationality, justice, and morality. The multitude of reforms legislated under Progressivist influence is too familiar to require listing. As for the peace workers, their foremost objective was a world court. If traditional diplomacy failed to settle a dispute between nations, the case, so long as it was justiciable (that is, so long as it fell within the scope of existing law or equity) was to be submitted to arbitration by an ad hoc panel of judges or by a permanent world court, the latter of which had been planned by the second Hague Conference. If there was disagreement as to whether the case was justiciable, a commission of inquiry would ascertain the facts and make a decision binding on the nations concerned.
Both groups, therefore, applied their faith that a set of rules, constructed rationally and administered impartially, would replace the oppression by a selfish minority with a system supervising the well-being of the majority. It is an important fact that the peace workers had, as their ideal, a world court rather than a world government. In this way they manifested their belief that justice and order would be maintained by machinery which was created by men but thereafter was only to be administered by them. Once the system of world law had been manipulated into existence, they felt, interjection of personality would only impair its functioning. Like the Progressives, they tended to be preoccupied with the virtues of machinery rather than governors. The question of the feasibility of preserving peace by compulsion was an academic one when Europe was at war. More immediate was the question of the American r6le in returning the world to peace, the American destiny on which the pacifists had relied. When the United States joined the war, a minority within the peace movement, as well as a large number outside of it who advocated peace from religious or Socialist premises, vigorously dissented, insisting that the sine qua non of pacifism was rejection of war as an end or a means. The majority of the peace workers were not so tenaciously pacifist, for Wilson had led the nation into the fight under a moral banner. Their ideology, which utilized humanitarian and rational arguments, allowed them to countenance intervention on Wilsonian terms. Even the American Peace Society recognized patriotic duty and the necessity to defeat Germany as preclusive of an unyielding opposition to all force in all circumstances.62 Later, however, it opposed Wilson's League, while the Foundation strongly supported the creation of Versailles.
Thus, victory in the war to end war did not fulfill the aspirations of all the peace workers. Instead, it left the movement in a tumult and left the country in disillusionment. Idealism had not survived the war without deep wounds.
